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ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKING
PROCEDURE IN ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKING *
ADMINISTRATIVE rule-making is one type of function per-
Sformed by administrative agencies. The procedural prob-
lems attending the exercise of this function are to some extent
distinct from those which surround the performance of other ad-
ministrative acts, such as decisions and orders addressed to par-
ticular individuals in licensing, workmen's compensation admin-
istration, and public health regulation. Rule-making, sometimes
referred to as " administrative legislation," and a companion
function, often called " administrative adjudication," have be-
come primary categories in the study of administrative law.'
In the United States, on the whole, administrative adjudication
has received by far the larger share of attention, but recently
"administrative legislation" has assumed greater prominence
than before. The New Deal legislation of 1933 was marked by
an unprecedented delegation of power to the President 2 and other
executive officers ' to prescribe regulations. Political and legal
discussion centered in large part upon the wisdom and consti-
tutionality of delegating these powers.' Some of the delegations
* The writer makes grateful acknowledgment to the Columbia University School
of Law for the opportunities afforded him as a Special Fellow in 1937-38 to engage
in the study of which this article is a product.
1 In "vertical" studies of particular administrative agencies the emphasis, how-
ever, is upon the manner in which these agencies perform the tasks entrusted to them,
rather than upon theoretical distinctions.
2 See 48 STAT. 52 (1933), 31 U. S. C. §821(b)(2) (1934) (regulation of the
gold content of the dollar) ; 48 STAT. 13, § 3 (1933) (variation of the compensation
of federal employees according to the cost of living) ; 48 STAT. 195, 1183 (i933, 1934),
I5 U. S. C. §§ 702, 7o2a (i934) (establishment of administrative agencies and fixa-
tion of the duration of the NIRA); 48 STAT. 196, I97 (I933), 1S U. S. C. §§ 703, 704
(1934) (promulgation of codes of fair competition and of import restrictions; pro-
vision of licensing of business enterprises) ; 48 STAT. 202 (I933), 40 U. S. C. § 403
(1934) (expenditures for public works).
a 48 STAT. 2 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 248(n) (1934) (authority of the Secretary of
the Treasury to require the surrender of gold and gold certificates); 48 STAT. 35
(i933), 7 U. S. C. § 6o9 (1934) (power of the Secretary of the Treasury to levy
processing taxes). For a further enumeration of rule-making powers under the
New Deal statutes, see (1933) 58 A. B. A. REP. 418-23; BLAcHLY AND OATM",
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION (1934) 10-30.
4 See, e.g., Hanna, Currency Control and Private Property (1933) 33 COL. L.
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were upheld,' but the National Industrial Recovery Act and the
later Bituminous Coal Conservation Act fell under the condem-
nation of the Supreme Court, partly because of the scope of the
delegated rule-making power contained in them.6 In the course
of its first NRA opinion, moreover, the Court pronounced uncon-
stitutional the procedure which the Act permitted and the Presi-
dent followed in promulgating certain regulations.' Hence the
problem of the permissible extent of administrative power to
prescribe regulations and that of the procedure to be employed
in formulating them have been brought to the fore.8
I. RULE-MAKING AS A DISTINCTIvE FUNCTION
The question arises whether it is useful to attempt to distin-
guish rule-making from other administrative functions for pro-
cedural purposes. That question involves, first, the possibility of
defining rule-making and, second, the utility of the definition if
it can be established.
It has been said that rule-making operates as to the future
whereas other mandatory governmental acts affect present or
past situations. However, almost all governmental orders have
the characteristic of prescribing or forbidding future conduct.
A judgment for money damages, an order for the abatement of a
nuisance, and a decree compelling an employer to bargain col-
lectively with a union must be executed in the future, no less than
REv. 6r7; Ellingwood, The New Deal and the Constitution (934) 28 ILL. L. REv.
729, 745 et seq.; Maggs, The Constitution and the Recovery Legislation (1934) 1
U. Cm. L. REv. 665, 69I; Carpenter, Constitutionality of the National Industrial
Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (1934) 7 So. CArsas. L. REV. 125,
126-28; Fuchs, The Constitutionality of the Recovery Program (1933) 19 ST. Louis
L. REv. x; Note (1933) 47 HARv. L. Rv. 85, 93-95.
5 Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 294 U. S. 240 (1934) ; Nortz v. United States,
294 U. S. 317 (,935) ; Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330 (I935) ; Holyoke Water
Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co., 300 U. S. 324 (1937). See also Smyth,
Ex'r v. United States, 302 U. S. 329 (1937).
6 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495, 529 (1936) ; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238,
310-12 (1936).
7 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 432 (1935).
s Hart, The Exercise of Rule-Making Power in REPORT oF PRESIDENT'S CONMI-
TEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGENENT (937) pt. II, 313-I5; Report of the Special
Committee on Administrative Law (937) 62 A. B. A. REP. 789; Feller, Prospectus
for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law (938) 47 YALE L. J. 647.
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a statute requiring the payment of taxes or an administrative
regulation which orders the submission of specified data by pub-
lic utilities to the government. Permissive regulations and li-
censes likewise have effect in the future and their revocation fre-
quently substitutes a prohibition for the previous permission.
Declaratory statements, findings, or decrees fall into a differ-
ent category. Commanding nothing, they purport simply to state
interpretations of law or to assert the existence of facts upon
which the later issuance of mandatory orders or the operation of
existing regulations may be expected to depend. An official state-
ment may seek to interpret a phrase in a taxing statute for the
purpose of applying it; an assessment may fix the basis upon
which future tax collections will be made; and a declaratory
judgment or administrative order may define with more or less
conclusiveness the particular rights and duties on the basis of
which judgments may later issue.' Sometimes the finding of a
fact, pursuant to statute, constitutes the contingency upon which
a prescribed general regulation operates in the future.1"
It is clear that mere futurity of operation, which is common to
most official acts, cannot serve to distinguish rule-making from
other governmental functions. It sometimes is said with respect
to legislation, however, that the considerations which enter into it
relate to the future and that adjudication is distinguishable be-
cause its basis lies in past facts and existing rules of law.1' This
suggested distinction conceivably may serve to define the func-
tion of rule-making.
According to the foregoing theory, the legislature translates
policy into law by prescribing legal rights and duties, with regard
primarily to the future welfare of the community and of those
immediately affected. Courts, on the other hand, decide in par-
ticular cases what specific rights and duties flow from those pre-
9 E.g., Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 562 (1937)
(certification of union as bargaining representative of workers). Since a declaratory
judgment in the sense in which recent statutes employ the term concludes the issues,
it is mandatory in actual effect, though not in legal form, and it may easily be trans-
lated into a mandatory judgment.
10 E.g., the flexible tariff acts. 46 STAT. 701 (1930), 19 U. S. C. §§ 1336-1338
('934).
11 See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 211 U. S. 210, 226 (igo8); Green,
Separation of Governmental Powers (X920) 29 YALE L. J. 369, 373.
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scribed in existing rules of law in the light of the facts presented. 2
The courts, according to this view, are concerned with the legal
consequences of past occurrences and not at all with the effects of
their decisions.
Legislation and adjudication cannot, however, be kept true to
these ideas. Courts must ascertain the content and scope of the
rules upon which they base their judgments; but these rules are
to a considerable extent conflicting and vague even when em-
bodied in constitutions and statutes, and hence do not afford ade-
quate guides. In choosing among them and imparting greater pre-
cision to them, courts may invoke considerations of fairness and
equity growing out of the facts, which have not previously been
embodied in rules, or read into the rules the logical prerequisites of
decisions that are felt to be desirable or necessary for future wel-
fare. In so far as these opportunities for choice exist, the judicial
process becomes "legislative" in character, for new law is cre-
ated on the basis of desired results. Conversely, legislators may
to some extent seek to offset past wrongs in conferring future
benefits." Evidently it cannot be said truthfully that adjudica-
tion is wholly determined by past facts and existing rules or that
legislation is enacted with an eye single to future welfare.
When the attempt is made to carry this distinction between
"legislation" and "adjudication" into the functions of the ex-
ecutive branch of the government, and to identify rule-making by
means of it, additional difficulties are encountered. Many acts
of the executive are supposed to be determined by considerations
of future advantage, indicated more or less definitely in the con-
trolling statute. In other words, they are discretionary acts. 4
Regulations governing some of the practices of banks and insur-
ance companies, safety regulations, and regulations prescribing
the conduct of public services fall within this category. So do
certificates of convenience and necessity, licenses to persons of
good moral character, rate orders, and the abatement of nuisances
12 See Radin, A Restatement oj Hohfeld (1938) 5i HAv. L. REV. 1141.
13 E.g., subsidies are granted to farmers because of the advantages which pro-
tective tariffs previously have bestowed upon manufacturers.
14 See Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law
Theory (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 538, 544-45; Cooper, Administrative Justice and the
Role of Discretion (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 577; HART, The ORnNANCE MAxING POWERS
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1925) 34.
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upon the general ground that they are threats to comfort or
decency. If rule-making were defined as official action based upon
considerations of future benefit, all of the foregoing types of ad-
ministrative acts would be included within it, for it would embrace
all discretionary action. So sweeping and varied a category would
hardly possess utility and certainly would depart far from ac-
cepted concepts.1 5
The most obvious definition of rule-making and the one most
often employed in the literature of administrative law asserts
simply that it is the function of laying down general regulations
as distinguished from orders that apply to named persons or to
specific situations.16 Most acts of legislatures, although by no
means all, establish rights and duties with respect either to
people generally or to classes of people or situations that are de-
fined but not enumerated. Conversely, the judgments of courts
usually are addressed to particular individuals or to situations
that are definitely specified. Similarly, administrative action can
be classified into general regulations, including determinations
whose effect is to bring general regulations into operation, and or-
ders or acts of specific application.
Difficulties present themselves in relation to this distinction
also. Classes of people or situations may be so narrowly defined
that the identity of the component units virtually is specified.
Thus a law or regulation forbidding the discharge of industrial
waste into the waters of a stream would not differ in effect, at
least immediately, from an order directed to the only millowner
15 It is true, however, that the facts pertinent to a discretionary decision often
call for an investigational rather than a litigious procedure, regardless of the type of
official action contemplated, as is coming to be appreciated with reference to judicial
decisions in which "legislative" considerations are prominent. See authorities cited
in Fuchs and Freedman, The Wagner Act Decisions and Factual Technique in Public
Law Cases (1937) 22 WAsH. U. L. Q. 510, 515, n.x8. For this purpose a classification
of functions based upon the presence of discretion has utility.
6 I COMMITTEE ON MINISTERS' POWERS (Report) (1932) 20; CARR, DELE-
GATED LEGISLATION (1921) 46; WILms, TnE PARLiAmENTARY POWERS OF ENGLISH
GovERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (1933) 49. Legislation " consists of an abstract formu-
lation of a general rule." ALLEN, LAW IN TH MAKING (1927) 238. By contrast,
"adjudication operates concretely upon individuals in their individual capacity."
DIcxINsoN, ADMINSTRATIVE JUSTicE AND TH Su REAcy or LAW (1927) 21.
17 "Private" acts are a recognized exception which the constitutions of only
some of the states have eliminated. Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627 (U. S. 1829).
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engaged in the practice.' 8 Conversely, an order establishing
specified freight rates on a named railroad affects a host of ship-
pers as well as the respondent and applies to a multitude of trans-
actions. 8 When an order, such as a labor injunction, applies to a
vague group of people of whom only a few are named, it takes on
the character of a general regulation." Even where only a single
respondent is subject to an order, the order seems general in char-
acter if it embraces a considerable area of conduct.'
Notwithstanding these difficulties, it is feasible to distinguish a
general regulation from an order of specific application on the
basis of the manner in which the parties subject to it are desig-
nated. If they are named, or if they are in effect identified by
their relation to a piece of property or transaction or institution
which is specified, the order is one of specific application. If
they are not named, but the order applies to a designated class of
persons or situations, the order is a general regulation or a rule.
Thus a railroad rate order is an order of specific application if one
or more railroads are named in it as the parties addressed, re-
gardless of how many shippers may be affected by it. Conversely,
an order that all carriers reduce their rates by a specified percent-
age would be a general regulation. Similarly, the increase or re-
duction of a single taxpayer's assessment is different for the pur-
pose in hand from the order of a state board raising or lowering
the assessment' upon a given class of property throughout a
county.
Of itself, of course, the foregoing distinction signifies nothing.
Its practical value turns upon whether there are other important
differences accompanying the distinction in form. There seem
to be such differences. Ordinarily an order addressed to named
persons or dealing with the legal interests of easily ascertainable
individuals bears directly upon a relatively small number of peo-
18 Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 619 (I9O5). See also
Ryder v. Board of Health of Lexington, 273 Mass. 177, 173 N. E. 58o (1930).
19 See DIcKINSON, ADMaNISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SuPREmAcy OF THE LAW
(1927) z8; FREUND, ADMIISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928)
I5.
20 See FRANEIuRTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 86-89, 123-
26.
21 Cf. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE CommIssIoN (1924) 72-77.
22 The parties are identified, though not named, for example, where a judgment
,C in rem decrees the forfeiture of an article of property.
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ple, whereas a general regulation is likely to affect many more.
Moreover, the identity of the parties who will be most immedi-
ately affected by an order of specific application is generally
known, whereas that of the persons upon whom a general regu-
lation will bear usually is known only in part. These two facts
have important consequences in regard to the procedure that is
appropriate to the two classes of orders.2"
Accordingly it is useful to define rule-making as the issuance of
regulations or the making of determinations which are addressed
to indicated but unnamed and unspecified persons or situations;
to distinguish this function from the issuance of orders or findings
or the taking of action applying to named or specified persons or
situations; and to consider separately the procedural problems
which surround rule-making when it is carried on by adminis-
trative agencies. For legal purposes these problems are of impor-
tance where regulations bear upon private interests. They will be
considered in this article in relation to rule-making which operates
with regulatory effect upon such interests.
II. THE BASES OF RULE-MAKING PROCEDURE
Administrative rule-making procedure necessarily requires
adaptation to the varying circumstances under which general regu-
lations are prescribed by administrative action. Thus a regula-
tion applying to the railroads of the United States permits, if it
does not require, an antecedent procedure involving a full hearing
to the affected parties,"4 whereas a rule of the Bureau of Marine
Inspection and Navigation applying to thousands of unknown
owners of small boats 25 can scarcely be preceded by an investi-
gation of the same character. It is one thing, moreover, to lay
down a simple regulation governing a particular aspect of the use
23 See p. 275, infra; testimony of Sir Arthur Robinson, Secretary, and E. J.
Maude, Solicitor, of the Ministry of Health, 2 COMMITTEE ON MnMsTss' POWERS
(Minutes of Evidence) (2932) 144 et seq.; cf. Wims, THE PARLIAmENTARY POWERS
or ENGLISH GOVERNmENT DEPARTMENTS (933) 183-84.
24 E.g., 36 STAT. 298 (1910), 45 U. S. C. § 12 (x934) (safety appliance regulations
to be changed only "after full hearing and for good cause shown ").
25 35 STAT. 69 (i9o8), 46 U. S. C. § 454 (934) (authorizing the Secretary of
Commerce to issue regulations "to promote the safety of life on navigable waters
during regattas and marine parades ").
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of streets by motorists," and quite another to prescribe the de-
tailed accounting practices of a large group of utilities in matters
of great technical difficulty affecting claims to large sums of
money.27 There is an equally important distinction between regu-
lations put forth with an eye single to the maintenance of a
smooth-working routine in the conduct of a public service," and
the highly discretionary code of financial controls by which it is
sought to direct, in part, the workings of a credit economy.2 A
single official, moreover, who perhaps is only intermittently in
touch with the problem to be governed," may proceed quite differ-
ently in arriving at a regulation from the way in which a board
of experts or of representative character is likely to attack a rule-
making problem.2' Finally, a regulation whose breach entails
simply the loss of a minor privilege 2 is quite different from one
whose violation may result in a penitentiary sentence. 2
Between the extremes which these examples represent many
shades of difference may be found. The aspects of rule-making
which determine the significant categories for procedural purposes
may, however, be grouped under the following headings: (i) the
character of the parties affected; (2) the nature of the problems
to be dealt with; (3) the character of the administrative deter-
mination; (4) the types of administrative agencies exercising the
rule-making function; and (5) the character of enforcement which
attaches to the resulting regulations.
The character of the parties affected by administrative regu-
lations varies widely, even when only those regulations that bear
upon private interests are considered. It varies not only with the
number and identifiability of the parties, which have obvious
26 Cavanaugh v. Gerk, 313 Mo. 375, 280 S. W. 5i (X926).
27 American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232 (1936).
28 I FED. REG. 2284 (x936) (procedure for the filing of executive orders and
proclamations); Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions (1918) 27 YALE
L. J. 892, 909.
29 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Regulations A-U.
80 50 STAT. 124, 22 U. S. C. § 245b(a) (Supp. 1937) (Secretary of State author-
ized to promulgate regulations for the enforcement of the National Munitions Con-
trol Act).
31 34 STAT. 881 (907), 46 U. S. C. § 375 (1934) (providing for the Board of
Supervising Inspectors of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation).
32 E.g., regulations governing the use of public recreation facilities.
83 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (I935).
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bearing upon the practicability of adequate notice and a full hear-
ing to all, but, in addition, with the vast differences in the extent
to which groups in the community are organized to safeguard
their interests in relation to governmental action. Groups that
are so organized can be heard or consulted more readily than
those that are not; and of the latter, many consist of large num-
bers of ordinary citizens who will be unrepresented unless the gov-
ernmental agency itself undertakes to protect their interests.
Consumers, 4 farmers, 5 small tradesmen, and those in receipt of
public assistance,"s are notoriously in need of being protected in
this manner. Group organization is especially important to the
development of a consultative type of procedure whereby inter-
ests are enabled to participate in official action instead of merely
being heard in regard to it."
The nature of the problems to be dealt with in administrative
regulations affects procedure in evident ways. Thus in matters of
governmental routine, even where private interests are affected, 8
as they are, for example, by the hours during which public offices
are open for business and by the forms prescribed for tax returns,
it is evident that there is less occasion for permitting interested
private parties to be heard with regard to proposed regulations
than there is where rule-making operates in a regulatory manner.
In the conduct of public services most of the matters that arise are
also of a routine nature, but others, such as the regulations for
34 2 COMMITrEE ON MINISTERS' POWERS (Minutes of Evidence) (1932) 5 (testi-
mony of Sir Maurice L. Gwyer, Treasury Solicitor). See CONSUMERS' COUNSEL
DIVISION OF AAA, CONSUMER SERVICES OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (rev. ed. x937)
1, 9 (for accounts of existing federal agencies which represent the consumer before
regulatory bodies).
35 Pub. L. No. 440, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (Feb. 16, 1938) § 201(a), authorizes the
Secretary of Agriculture to initiate cases and appear in proceedings before the Inter-
state Commerce Commission involving rates and practices in the transportation of
farm products.
86 The English Ministry of Health has found it possible to maintain effective con-
tact with groups that are affected by its administrative activities, except under the
Widows', Orphans', and Old Age Contributory Pension Act. 2 COMMITEE ON MIN-
ISTERS' POWERS (Minutes of Evidence) (1932) 120 (supplementary memorandum
from the Minister of Health).
37 Gaus, A Theory of Organization in Public Administration, in GAus, WEITE
AND DImOCK, TmE FRONTIERS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1936) c. V.
38 See, e.g., the matter of prescribing the design of motor vehicle license plates,
mentioned in the testimony of Sir Maurice L. Gwyer, Treasury Solicitor, in 2 COM-
MITEE ON MINISTERS' POWERS (Minutes of Evidence) (1932) 3.
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grazing in the national forests, assume such commercial signifi-
cance that some formality of rule-making procedure is called for."
In governmental regulatory activities affecting health and safety,
the occasional urgency of action and the technical nature of the
questions arising, falling outside the competence of witnesses,
tend to minimize the need of formality in rule-making procedure.
Where, however, important economic groups are affected by pro-
posed regulations of the same general character, there are strong
grounds for according procedural recognition to their stake in the
issues. These considerations have been recognized in the pro-
cedural provisions of the 1938 Pure Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.4" Recently, without statutory requirement, the Bureau of
Marine Inspection and Navigation, which proceeded for nearly a
century to prescribe safety regulations through a purely delib-
erative board,4 held hearings upon proposed rules for the con-
struction of tank vessels.42 A subsequent statute covering the
same matters contains a requirement for such hearings." For
similar reasons, occupational safety codes frequently are arrived
at after consultation with affected groups.44
Where economic control of private business enterprise is the
purpose of regulation, the practice of according procedural formal-
ities to affected interests in rule-making as well as in framing or-
ders of specific application is especially applicable. Within this
broad field of governmental control, however, differentiations need
to be made. Procedural formality may be expected to increase
roughly in proportion to the directness with which economic regu-
lation affects the financial condition of the affected business enter-
prises. Hence, control of methods and practices whose bearing
upon income and outgo is indirect " can proceed more freely than
regulation of rates and prices or of factors entering visibly into
the cost of doing business.4" Thus, the prescription of insurance
39 COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNcTIoNs oF NATIONAL ADmISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES
(1927) 208-IO.
40 Pub. L. No. 717M, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 25, 1938), 21 U. S. C. A. § 301
et seq. (Supp. 1938).
41 10 STAT. 70, § 18 (1852).
42 1 FED. REG. 467 (x936). The regulations were to be promulgated under the
Act of Aug. 26, 1935, c. 697, 49 STAT. 868 (i935), 46 U. S. C. § I78 (Supp. 1937).
43 49 STAT. 1890 (1936), 46 U. S. C. §3i9a(3) (Supp. 1937).
44 ANDREWS, ADMINISTRATIVE LABOR LEGISLATION (1936) 42, 71-78, 97.
45 Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176 (1935).
46 United States v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 293 U. S. 454 (I935).
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policy forms need have, and to some extent does have, fewer of
the aspects of a judicial proceeding than a rate-fixing order issued
by the same authority." More recently the establishment of
minimum wages by administrative action has called for ample
notice-and-hearing procedure.48
The character of the administrative determination which an au-
thority is called upon to make, having regard to the mental proc-
esses involved, has an important effect upon the suitable proce-
dure. Some degree of discretion, involving a choice either of the
ends to be served or of the means to be employed in attaining de-
fined ends, usually is involved in rule-making. Regulations for
the routine operations of a public office, for example, involve at
least an appraisal of the factors that bear upon efficiency; and the
administrator who is responsible for the regulations must frame
them to serve the prescribed end of effective conduct of his office.
There is little occasion for obtaining facts or opinions from outside
interests in the making of such determinations, even where there
are groups that will be affected by the regulations. The same may
be said of regulations in matters of health, such as the imposition
of restrictions to prevent the spread of an epidemic. Although
these may bear heavily upon private interests, the determinations
involved are of so expert a character, embracing primarily a choice
of means for the attainment of a definite, legally prescribed pur-
pose, that there is little or no occasion for hearing or consulting
affected groups. The need is rather for hewing resolutely to the
line of duty, regardless of the possible clamor of interests."
Where official discretion in the exercise of regulatory func-
tions 1o involves a choice of ends to be served, however, the need
for hearing or consulting affected individuals and groups is
marked. Rule-making functions that require such choices occur
in a wide variety of circumstances. Thus in the regulation of
marketing practices a balance must be struck between the inter-
47 PATTERSON, THE INsURANcE COMBISSIONER 32; THE UNITED STATES (1927)
389, 390, 406. Statutory procedural requirements are still in a rudimentary stage
in respect to insurance regulation. Ibid.
48 Mass. Acts 1937, C. 401, §§ 4-io; Pub. L. No. 718, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (June
25, 1938) §§ 8--IO; ii U. S. C. A. §§ 208-Io (Supp. 1938).
49 See COmmR, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS oF NATIONAL ADmTRATIVE AUTHORI-
TIES (1927) 230.
50 The discretion involved in the performance of nonregulatory functions also
may involve a choice of ends, but its exercise when private interests are not directly
19381
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ests of buyers and those of sellers, sometimes without statutory
guides as to which are to be preferred.5 In imposing safety
regulations with respect to locomotives the Interstate Commerce
Commission must decide the point at which the furtherance of
safety ceases to justify additional drains upon the carriers' in-
comes, without legislative direction other than that locomotives
shall be "in proper condition and safe to operate." ". Again, in
deciding whether to authorize substandard wages within a sub-
division of an industry under the 1938 Wage-Hour law the Ad-
ministrator must make up his mind whether to prefer the interest
of competitors in maintaining the plane of competition or that of
a group of producers in continuing to exist; for he is directed to
give attention to both." Such weighty determinations are not to
be made without procedural safeguards, and in each of the fore-
going instances they have been provided by administrative action
or by statute.
Procedure should be adjusted also to the types of administrative
agencies exercising the rule-making functions. If a nonexpert
Assistant Secretary of Commerce is to recommend regulations for
safety in air flight,"4 the means by which he will inform himself
of the matters he is to control are likely to differ rather widely
from those employed in an analogous field by a board of inspectors
who have devoted their lives to the preservation of safety in
navigation.55 If a board or commission is to make determinations
affected does not require procedural formalities. Thus no one would suppose that
hearings should precede a revision of the Army Regulations. Such rule-making func-
tions fall outside the scope of this study.
51 The successive labeling requirements for substandard canned foods under the
McNary-Mapes Amendment to the Federal Pure Food and Drug Act [46 STAT. 1o9
(1930), 21 U. S. C. § 10 (i934) ] have represented a shifting balance between the in-
terest of the main body of canners in protection against the competition of low-
quality products and the interest of low-income groups of consumers in a supply of
wholesome, inexpensive food that has not been rendered forbidding by a "crepe"
label. The products in question are in no sense adulterated or harmful, but simply
fall below certain standards of quality, or desirability, which the Secretary of Agri-
culture is authorized to establish. The statute requires only that the label "indicate
that such canned food falls below" the prescribed standard.
52 43 STAT. 659 (924), 45 U. S. C. § 23 (1934).
53 Pub. L. No. 7x8, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 25, X938) § 8(b),(e), 29 U. S. C. A.
§ 2o8(b),(e) (Supp. 1938).
54 See 48 STAT. 113, 49 U. S. C. § 173 (I934) (now superseded).
55 See note 31, supra.
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of economic consequence, a formal hearing or consultation may
be an efficient means of bringing relevant factors before all of the
members at the same time, whereas a single official might inform
himself more easily upon the same question by means of a simple
investigation. If an agency is representative of the interests af-
fected by its acts, the need for hearings and consultations in ad-
vance of its determinations obviously is reduced or eliminated.56
The character of the enforcement which attaches to a regula-
tion also has a bearing upon the procedure which is best adapted
to its formulation. If the regulation is subject to challenge in all
of its aspects after its promulgation,57 the need of advance for-
malities is reduced or eliminated. If it binds the affected parties
only by requiring them to comply with certain procedures in mat-
ters subsequently arising - as, for example, in future applications
for licenses- it is not likely to be sufficiently weighty in its ef-
fects to warrant advance hearings or consultations in regard to its
content.5" When, however, a regulation presents affected parties
56 Canadian provincial legislation regarding the extension of collective labor
agreements to nonsignatories reflects this fact interestingly. In Quebec, the Minister
of Labor must give notice and may hold a hearing before a decree is entered by the
Lieutenant Governor in Council. Quebec Statutes x937, c. 49, § 5, as amended by
Statutes 1938, C. 52, § 2. In Ontario and Alberta, on the other hand, where only such
agreements as are negotiated in open conferences summoned by the Minister may be
extended, no further procedure is required in advance of a decree. Ontario Statutes
1936, C. 29, §§ 4-6, as amended by Statutes 1937, c. 32, § 6; Alberta Statutes 1935,
c47, §§ 7-r1, as amended by Statutes 1938, c.56, § 2. See Note, Collective Agree-
ments in Foreign Countries (1936) 43 Mo. LAB. RV. 398.
57 E.g., many Treasury, Federal Reserve, and other regulations are interpre-
tative of statutory provisions which do not purport to confer discretion upon the
rule-making agency. Hence they are subject to complete judicial review if they
are challenged in court. The fact that the challenge may be expensive, that weight
attaches to the administrative interpretation in the eyes of the courts [Houston v.
St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 249 U. S. 479 (igi9) ; Modern System Dentists,
Inc. v. State Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Wis. 190, 256 N. W. 922 (1934)], and
that re-enactment of a statute impliedy incorporates outstanding administrative
interpretations into its terms [McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488
(1931), with which compare, however, Lynch, Ex'x v. Tilden Produce Co., 265
U. S. 315 (1924)] perhaps warrants more thorough procedural provisions than now
exist in connection with their formulation; but ciearly the need is less great than
it would be if no challenge were possible. See ComsR, LEOISIATIVwE FuNcIONS oF
NATIOxAL ADMnINSTRATIv AuxlOTImEs (1927) C. V.
58 The existence of a body of practitioners who are called upon for regular
observance of procedural regulations may make it desirable that its members be
heard or consulted in connection with their formulation. Rules of court are in-
creasingly being devised with the collaboration of members of the bar.
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with the alternative of compliance or loss of property or liberty,
with only limited opportunity or none at all to challenge its cor-
rectness, the need is evident for an antecedent opportunity to in-
fluence its content or be heard in regard to it.
Obviously an enormous number of permutations and combina-
tions of the foregoing factors is possible. No simple rules exist or
can be hoped for to serve as guides in the formulation of desirable
procedures. All that can be hoped for are suggestive considera-
tions which may serve to present the essential procedural issues
more clearly and to introduce elements of rationality and con-
sistency into their determination.
A much less self-conscious method has determined the proce-
dures that actually prevail. Many regulatory administrative
agencies, undirected and unhampered by statutory prescriptions,
and unenlightened as well as undeterred by advice of counsel,
have developed methods which are quite informal and which never
have become involved in litigation. In many instances these have
remained uncodified practice, often varying from case to case as
practical officials, untrained in law, have gone about their business
of getting things done as expeditiously and smoothly as possible.
Attempts to crystallize the procedure of such agencies into pre-
scribed methods might well result in lessened efficiency occasioned
by unaccustomed and unnecessary attention to matters of form.
In other instances, rule-making procedure has assumed a formal
character with apparently an almost equal lack of design, by rea-
son largely of association with methods employed by the same
agency in the decision of cases by formal methods.59
Rule-making procedure is devised, however, not only in the
course of administration itself but also in the drafting of legisla-
tion and in court review of administrative proceedings. Legisla-
tion and judicial review yield, on the whole, no greater evidence of
calculated adaptation of procedure to actual needs than is afforded
by administrative practice. If a statute perchance requires that
a regulation be promulgated only" after hearing," it is almost cer-
tain not to specify what shall be the nature of the hearing afforded;
and if a judicial decision attaches a specific strict requirement to
59 There is little doubt that the methods of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion in preparing safety regulations have, without conscious design, become increas-
ingly similar to those employed in rate cases. See United States v. Baltimore &
0. R. R., 293 U. S. 454 (1935).
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rule-making procedure in a particular instance," the opinion prob-
ably will not trouble to set forth the reason for imposing it in that
instance as distinguished from others or to state in what other
situations it may be required. In a few recent statutes, however,
which call for executive rule-making in highly controversial mat-
ters, a procedure that is designed to secure due attention to the in-
terests of all affected parties has been prescribed with some par-
ticularity.6 In general, moreover, a heightened consciousness of
the importance of administrative procedure has resulted from re-
cent pronouncements of the Supreme Court.62
III. TYPES OF RuLE-MAKING PROCEDURE
The administrative rule-making procedures that have grown up
as a result of the interplay of the foregoing factors may be sepa-
rated for convenience into four general types. These are (i) in-
vestigational procedure, (2) consultative procedure, (3) auditive
procedure, and (4) adversary procedure. The names here as-
signed to these types are somewhat arbitrary, but they lay stress
in each instance upon the most significant aspects of the procedure
designated. Roughly speaking, the four types of procedure have
come into use in the order named. All of them prevail in various
fields of administration at the present time.
The investigational procedure is analogous to that of legisla-
tures. A legislature is theoretically competent to dispose of mat-
ters coming before it without according procedural formalities to
affected interests. It is vested with full discretion and final au-
thority, subject to constitutional limitations. Its representative
character brings the community's knowledge and wisdom into the
exercise of its discretion.6" The parliamentary law which con-
trols legislative proceedings is designed to secure fair discussion,
adequate deliberation, and efficiency in the disposition of matters
coming before legislative assemblies and not at all to accord pro-
cedural rights to outside individuals and groups.
Nevertheless, legislatures, like other bodies, find it necessary to
60 See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); United States v. Balti-
more & 0. R. R., 293 U. S. 454 (i935).
61 See statutes cited notes 40, 53, supra.
62 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); United States v. Baltimore
& 0. R. R., 293 U. S. 454 (1935); Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. i (1938).
63 JoHN ADnAis, Thoughts on Government (1776) in 4 WORKS (I85I) 95.
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inform themselves specially concerning particular matters with
which they must deal. An elaborate process of committee investi-
gations, hearings, and reports has been developed for this purpose.
The extent to which this procedure shall be used in particular in-
stances, however, and the degree of participation which shall be
permitted to those concerned remain wholly within legislative
'control. The channels through which the legislators may obtain
information and acquaint themselves with points of view in the
community are unlimited. There are no procedural forms whose
observance can be demanded.64 The investigational method may
range as widely and proceed as informally as the legislature
wishes.
Similar freedom prevails in the investigational activity of many
administrative rule-making agencies. Performing functions
which resemble the making of many statutes, they naturally em-
ploy similar investigational methods. In place of the competence
which the legislature derives from its representative character,
their discretion is founded upon their expertness, or at least their
specialization, within designated fields of administration; and
that discretion extends to their investigational methods as well as
to the content of their official pronouncements. Few adminis-
trative agencies have been subjected to statutory or judicial con-
trol of any kind in regard to their rule-making procedure.
Consultative rule-making procedure has grown out of the prac-
tice, to which legislatures and administrative rule-making agencies
have resorted increasingly, of receiving opinions, advice, and sug-
gestions from groups whom their work affects. It is inevitable, on
the one hand, that such groups should seek to make their wishes
known and, on the other hand, that officials should turn to them
for information upon the problems to be solved. The complexity
of these problems under modern conditions makes consultation
with those who are" on the inside " virtually a necessity.65
64 Where, however, the legislature seeks to compel testimony in the course of an
investigation, it must do so subject to constitutional limitations. These, however,
permit a wide latitude in regard to the range of matters to be investigated and the
procedure to be employed. Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Con-
tempt (1926) 74 U. or PA. L. REv. 691, 78o; Landis, Constitutional Limitations on
the Congressional Power of Investigation (1926) 40 HARV. L. REv. 153.
65 See CmI.mBERLAIN, LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES (1936) 64 et seq.; Walker, Where
Does Legislation Originate? (1929) iS NAT. MuNic. REv. 565; Beutel, Pressure of
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Few administrative rule-making agencies whose work affects
organized groups, especially economic groups, fail to maintain
fairly regular contacts with them.6 The Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Nav-
igation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
the Food and Drug Administration, and many others follow this
practice. Occasionally proposed regulations are submitted to a
governmental agency by an expert, interested private organization.
When an administrative agency itself frames proposed regulations
the practice almost uniformly is to submit them to a long list of
interested individuals and groups for suggestion and comment.
Thereafter, discussion and correspondence often go forward at
great length. At times advisory committees, established by ad-
ministrative action or by legislation," engage regularly in the re-
view of proposed regulations.
To a considerable extent in England and to a less extent in this
country, the consultative method of proceeding has been standard-
ized by the creation of statutory advisory committees. These are
entitled to be consulted in the rule-making process. They serve
one or more of the following purposes: (i) to furnish information
and suggestions to the administrative agency; (2) to insure the
presentation of the contentions of interested groups to the respon-
sible authorities; and (3) to "educate" the affected parties,
through the members of the advisory committee, in regard to the
regulations that are adopted.
The consultative type of procedure obviously is inapplicable
where the groups affected by regulations are very numerous or the
Organized Interests as a Factor in Legislation (1929) 3 So. CALI. L. R v. io; HER-
RING, GROUP REPRESENTATION BE]ORE CONGRESS (1929); 9 ENCYC. Soc. SCIENCES
(1933) 565.
86 For English practices see CARR, DELEGATED LEGISLATION (1921) 31-32; 2 CoM-
MiTEE ON MINISTERS' PowERs (Minutes of Evidence) (1932) 5 (testimony of Sir
Maurice L. Gwyer, Treasury Solicitor), 12o et seq. (supplemental memorandum
from the Ministry of Health); for American practices see WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1926) 407-10; HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINIS-
TRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1936) 28-43.
67 HERRING, op. cit. supra note 65, c. XXI; FAIRLIE, ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
IN CONNECTION WITr STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS IN GREAT BRITAIN (1925)
66-75; Hart, The Exercise of Rule-Making Power in REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S COM-
MITTEE ON ADmSTRATIVE MANAGEMENT (1937) 339.
1938]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
parties are unorganized. Auditive procedure, either by itself or as
a supplement to the types previously described, affords an oppor-
tunity to such interests to express their views, as well as a means
whereby rule-making agencies may receive fruitful suggestions.
This procedure consists of the holding of duly-announced hear-
ings at which interested parties are permitted to appear. There
are no specific issues or rules of evidence or formalities of any
kind except such as are necessary to assure order. Such hearings
are analogous to legislative hearings 6 and bear no relation to court
proceedings. They are valuable to the extent that notice of them
can be brought home to affected parties, that they are accessible
to these parties, and that the questions involved are susceptible to
intelligent discussion by those who do appear. This auditive type
of procedure is increasingly being resorted to voluntarily by ad-
ministrative agencies 89 and is required frequently in statutes.
To a considerable extent, however, government is not the mov-
ing force in the framing of regulatory measures or, if it is, finds
itself opposed by other interests. The function of legislation in
recent times has been stated to be essentially that of effecting com-
promises which enable society to go forward with reasonable satis-
faction to contending interests," and legislative procedure has
been characterized as analogous to judicial procedure, with" plain-
tiffs" and "defendants" presenting cases before "courts." 71
All the more in administrative rule-making, which frequently
serves as a focus of conflict among fairly stable groups with refer-
ence to well-defined issues, do the proceedings take on an ad-
versary character.
The adversary procedure in rule-making, like so many other
aspects of administrative law, seems to have crystallized first in
the regulation of railroads. It is in the state utility commissions
and the Interstate Commerce Commission that administrative
procedure has assumed its most formal aspect. Although these
bodies are freed by statute from the requirements of judicial pro-
68 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Garrett, et al., 231 U. S. 298, 307 (1913) ; Bi-Metallic
Investment Co. v. Colorado, 239 U. S. 441, 445 (1915); Norwegian Nitrogen Prod-
ucts Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 305, 319 (1933); Highland Farms Dairy, Inc.
v. Agnew, i6 F. Supp. 575, 586 (E. D. Va. 1936).
69 See note 42, supra; Hart, supra note 67, at 340.
70 T. V. SmTH, TBE PROMISE OF AMERICAN PorTIcs (1936) z96.
71 CITA BERLAIN, LEGIsLATIVE PROCESSES (1936) 4-5.
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cedure,71 they and their trial examiners sit as tribunals before
whom affected interests and government representatives present
evidence and arguments; 71 they are required to base their factual
conclusions upon "evidence" and to embody them in careful
"findings "; and they maintain formal records embodying all
the evidence presented at their hearings.75 Whether a commission
may go outside the record for information, not regularly the sub-
ject of "judicial notice," upon which to base a decision, is a sub-
ject of controversy. 6 In any event, adherence to these and other
aspects of a careful, essentially adversary procedure is usual and
is to a large extent judicially enforced.
Neither in the case of the Interstate Commerce Commission nor
in that of the other federal agencies whose procedure is fashioned
more or less upon the same model "7 is an express distinction made
between proceedings involving named parties and proceedings
leading to the formulation of general regulations. In the case of
the Interstate Commerce Commission certain differences have
been recognized between proceedings involving many parties and
those concerning only a few. In the former, where the same issue
relates to all the parties, the evidence upon which the result is
based need not deal specifically with the affairs of each affected
carrier." In proceedings affecting a host of motor carriers or in-
volving complex matters such as accounting regulations, it is mani-
festly impossible to extend full rights of cross-examination to
each party or to enter detailed findings upon each point covered in
the regulations. Especially in the early stages of a commission's
work, when blanket regulations are to be prescribed, is an auditive
72 Smith, Practice and Procedure before the Interstate Commerce Commission
(1937) 5 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 404.
73 See the summarized account in the Introduction to BLACHLY, WORKING
PAPERS ON ADmI=STRATE ADDicATioN, prepared for the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) ; Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 20
(1938).
74 Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194 (1931) ; United States v. Chicago, M.,
St. P. & P. R. R., 294 U. S. 499 (1935).
7. United States v. Abilene & S. Ry., 265 U. S. 274 (1924).
76 Hanft, Utilities Commissions as Expert Courts (1936) i5 N. C. L. REV. 12.
77 The Federal Power Commission, the Federal Communications Commission.
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Bituminous Coal Commission,
and the Civil Aeronautics Authority.
178 Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. v. United States, 282 U. S. 74 (1930).
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or consultative method likely to be followed. 9 In the main, how-
ever, the adversary type of procedure is employed, leading to a
decision for or against a proposed regulation - a method which
is furthered by the frequent practice of entertaining petitions from
interested parties for desired regulations, which are opposed by
those who would be adversely affected."
It is doubtful whether the adversary procedure is well adapted
to the formulation of general regulations. Even when a regulation
covers only a single subject, such as the installation of power re-
verse gears on locomotives, the facts to which the evidence and the
findings must relate are not limited in time or space or number of
parties affected. They embrace such questions, for example, as
the degree of hazard involved in prevailing practices and the im-
provement to be expected from requiring a change. Multitudi-
nous occurrences bear upon such a question and the element of
judgment that enters into its determination is necessarily large.
The issues to be determined are not legally defined, as are the ele-
ments considered in a public utility rate case, for example. In
resolving the issues that relate to rule-making a more wide-ranging
inquiry and a freer marshalling of the evidence seem necessary.
Notwithstanding these considerations, recent federal legislation
has displayed a tendency to require the adversary type of proce-
dure in rule-making ' and, moreover, to subject the resulting regu-
lations to rather thorough judicial review. The Bituminous Coal
Act of 1937 provides that " No order which is subject to judicial
review . . . and no rule or regulation which has the force and ef-
fect of law shall be made or prescribed by the Commission, unless
it has given reasonable public notice of a hearing, and unless it has
afforded interested parties an opportunity to be heard, and unless
it has made findings of fact. Such findings, if supported by sub-
stantial evidence, shall be conclusive upon review thereof by any
court of the United States." 82 Thus the procedure in rule-making
79 SHARFfmAN, THE INTERSTATE COM1RCE COMNiSSION (1935) pt. Il-A, 70-74.
80 Johnson v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., igo I. C. C. 351 (1933); United States v.
Baltimore & 0. R. R., 5 F. Supp. 929 (N. D. Ohio 1933), aff'd, 293 U. S. 454 ('935),
further proceedings, 222 I. C. C. 542 (1937).
81 In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Industrial Comm., 24 F. Supp. 370 (D.
Minn. 1938), the view is advanced that probably due process requires the observ-
ance of the procedure that is usual in rate cases for the formulation of a minimum
wage order applicable to many industries in a state.
82 50 STAT. 73, 15 U. S. C. § 829 (Supp. 1937).
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is equated to that in the formulation of orders, with judicial review
of regulations made equally as comprehensive, if not equally as
available," as that which is given to orders. Regulations that
have "the force and effect of law" are intended, no doubt, to in-
clude all those which are not merely procedural and which are
backed by penal sanctions or by expulsion from membership in the
Bituminous Coal Code, entailing the obligation to pay a 19.5 per
cent additional sales tax.84
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 specifically requires
not only that the issuance of regulations under it shall be preceded
by notice and hearing but also that the regulations shall be accom-
panied by " detailed findings of fact" and shall be based" only on
substantial evidence of record at the hearing." 8 Judicial review
of questions of law involved in the issuance of regulations under
the Act and of whether the findings of fact are supported by" sub-
stantial evidence" is provided.8 6 Thus, such technical, widely-
ramifying matters as standards of identity and quality for foods,
the information to be conveyed by the labels on dietary products,
the quantities of poisonous residues to be permitted in food prod-
ucts, and the habit-forming qualities of narcotic derivatives must
be determined in the manner in which the conformity of a ship-
ment of goods to specifications is tried in a lawsuit. The consider-
ations entering into such determination must be segregated so that
the substantiality of the supporting evidence may be tested in
court. The court may then either affirm the order or "set it aside
in whole or in part, temporarily or permanently" and, if the Sec-
retary of Agriculture should refuse to obey the court's decree, may
order him" to take action . . . in accordance with law."
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act also, wage orders applying
to entire industries must be based upon evidence contained in a
record and may be subjected to judicial review of questions of law
and of the substantiality of the supporting evidence." The judi-
83 The review provided by the Act itself extends only to "orders," but other
means of reviewing regulations exist, such as injunction suits to prevent their en-
forcement. Id. § 6(b), (c), 15 U. S. C. § 836(b), (c) (Supp. 1937).
" Id. § 3(b), 5(b), 15 U. S. C. §§ 830(b), 835(b) (Supp. 1937).
85 Pub. L. No. 77, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 25, 1938) § 701(e), 2i U. S. C. A.
§ 371(e) (Supp. X938).
86 Id. § 7oi(f), 21 U. S. C. A. § 371(f) (Supp. 1938).
s7 Pub. L. No. 718, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 25, 1938) §§ 8, io(a), 29 U. S.
C. A. § 208, 21o(a) (Supp. 1938). Also illustrative of recent tendencies in federal
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cial review, however, will extend to the validity of each order
only so far" as it is applicable to the petitioner" in the case. The
issues, therefore, will be somewhat narrowed.8
IV. CONCLUSION
Recent developments open a new chapter in rule-making pro-
cedure. Whether the result will be a partial paralysis of admin-
istration by reason of excessive formality and litigation or an
improvement in the precision with which administrative determi-
nations are made cannot be discussed here. Probably it is too early
in any event to forecast the outcome. Much will depend upon
the realism with which administrators and courts differentiate the
rule-making problems that confront them from the problems that
arise in proceedings affecting definite parties, and upon the care
with which they discriminate in the field of rule-making accord-
ing to the presence of factors which have genuine procedural sig-
nificance.
Certainly there will never be a time when it will be possible to
assert that the details of rule-making procedure, or even the
"basic requirements of fair play " " in such procedure, should be
the same in all the varied circumstances that arise. Many regu-
lations, even where private interests are affected, should continue
to be issued on the basis of administrative knowledge or after
merely informal investigation; others will call for systematic
consultation with affected parties or regularized opportunities for
such parties to be heard; still others, perhaps, will involve ad-
versary proceedings in which parties are accorded virtually the
status of litigants. But a particularism that regards each proced-
ural problem as unrelated to others goes beyond the requirements
of the present situation. Common factors exist amidst the prevail-
ing diversity and may be made the basis of procedural norms, run-
ning through much administrative practice.
Ralph F. Fuchs.
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL Op LAW.
legislation is the Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act of 1937, 50 STAT. 246, 7
U. S. C. § 6oi et seq. (Supp. 1937). For procedural provisions, see § 8(c) (3), (4),
(9) and (i5). See also Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm. of Pa.,
i A.(2d) 775 (Pa. 1938).
88 Id. § io(a).
89 Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 22 (1938).
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